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1. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has emerged for the first time in New Zealand, 
a number of cases dealing with the effects of "solicitor's approval" 
clauses as conditions in land transactions. The first two of these cases 
were Buhrer v. Tweedie [1973] 1 NZLR 517, and Frampton v. Mccully [1976] 
1 NZLR 270. They held that where an offer or acceptance was made subject 
to the approval of a solicitor of one one the parties, the condition 
operated to prevent the formation of the contract until approval was given. 
As a consequence, no limits existed on the discretion of the solicitor in 
approving or disapproving. 
However, the third New Zealand case, Boote v. R.T. Shiels and Co. Ltd. 
[1978] 1 NZLR 445, held that the use of the words, "this offer is subject 
to my solicitor's approavel", had not prevented the formation of an 
immediately binding contract because the "solicitor's approval" clause 
provided that approval was to be given" within seven days from acceptance 
date". The use of the words, "from acceptance date", was viewed as showing 
that the "solicitor's approval" clause was intended to operate as a condition 
subsequent to the formation of the contact. The finding of a contract in 
the Boote case had the effect of limiting the solicitor's discretion under 
the approval clause to a consideration of the "conveyancing aspects" of 
the transaction. 
It was then recognised by Professor Brian Coote in his article Coote 
"'Solicitor's Approval" - A partial Solution' (1980) NZLJ 430, that two 
serious problems emerged from "solicitor's approval" clauses in land 
transactions being treated as conditions subsequent. Firstly, the 
constraints on ~he solicitor's discretion in such a case would mean there 
would be little scope for the solicitor to act as a means of consumer 
protection for his client, even though this is the obvious intention in 
many cases. Secondly, the restriction of the role of the solicitor would 
conflict with his usual role of acting in his client's best interests in 
all respects. A further consequence of the restriction is that the 
traditional confidentiality of the solicitor/client relationship is 
threatened if the solicitor is required to divulge his reasons for 
disapproval. Coote suggested that a partial solution to these problems 
might be to give the words "subject to solicitor's approval" their normal 
literal meaning and hold that no binding obligation has been accepted by 
the parties. 
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The effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Provost 
Developments Ltd. v Collingwood Towers Ltd. [1980] 2 NZLR 205, however, 
was to hold that "solicitor's approval" clauses in documents expressed as 
agreements for sale and purchase will ordinarily be taken to condition the 
performance rather than the formation of the contact. On the facts of the 
Provost Developments case, this meant that the vendor's solicitor was only 
able to take into account the "legal implications" of the transaction in 
the exercise of his discretion. 
The two questions which this paper will examine relate to the first 
problem raised by Coote above. Firstly, in light of the Provost Developments 
decision, is there scope for holding that a "solicitor's approval" clause 
in a sale and purchase agreement, will condition the formation of the 
contact, and if so, to what extent? Secondly, what is the scope of the 
"legal implications" test? 
II. THE PROVOST DECISION 
A. The Facts 
The facts of the Provost Developments case are that an agreement 
(between the plaintiff/appellant in the action, Provost Developments Ltd., 
who was the purchaser, and the defendant/respondent, Collingwood Towers 
Ltd., who was the vendor) was executed for the sale and purchase of several 
house properties that were occupied by monthly tenants. There was 
considerable bargaining between the parties before they entered into the 
agreement. The written instrument representing the agreement was a 
standard form used by the Law Society and the Real Estate Institute in the 
Auckland District. The price was $85,000, to be paid by a deposit of $5,000, 
and the balance secured by first mortgage in favour of the vendor for six 
months. The property was to be sold free of existing tenancies and the 
agreement contained the clause "subject to solicitors' approval by Friday, 
30 June 1978 by 5 p.m.". "Solicitors'" in this context referred to both the 
purchaser's and the vendor's solicitors. The purchaser's solicitor duly 
approved, but before 30 June, the vendor's solicitor advised that he would 
not approve the transaction, stating in a letter to the purchaser's 
solicitor, that "the contract is at an end". 
After hearing evidence from a director of the vendor company and the 
vendor's solicitor, Holland J. at first instance made the following findings 
of fact concerning the vendor's solicitor's reasons for failing to approve 
the transaction·. His Honour's findings are quoted by Woodhouse J. at page 
207 of the Provost Developments case: 
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" I am satisfied that Mr Dew (the vendor ' s solicitor ) di s approved 
of the agreement because he was concerned about the delay in 
cash payment and the provision requiring vacant possession to 
be given , but primarily becau se he felt confident that his 
client was able to get an agreement on better terns . Had there 
not been another prospective purchaser in the offing and had 
not Mr Dew at the time felt confident that a better offer could 
have been obtained , I doubt if he would have not approved the 
agreement, the terms of which I am satisfied were clearly known 
by the directors of the defendant company at the time the agree-
ment was completed". 
As a consequence of the refusal to approve by the vendor ' s sol icitor, 
the p u rchaser brought an action for specific performance. 
B . The Decision at First Instance 
Holland J . at first instance found in favour of the defendants by 
holding that although there had existed a concluded contract between the 
parties, the vendor was not bound to perform it because it's solicitor 
had validly refused to approve the transaction. 
His Honour applied the " conveyancing aspects " test suggested in the 
Boote case , in a wide sense . His Honour states, as Woodhouse J. quotes at 
page 208 of the Provost Developments case , that 
" in using the words ' conveyancing aspects ' , I respectfully 
suggest he (Cooke J . in the Boote case) did not intend them 
to be interpreted narrowly , but meant arising out of the 
d u ties and obligations owed by a solicitor to his client 
when acting for that client and advising concerning a 
conveyancing matter. That must include, in most cases, a 
considered view or opinion as to the transaction the client 
is entering into as a whole". 
Hollqnd J. supported this interpretation by stating, as Woodhouse J . quotes 
at page 208 of the Provost Developments case, that 
" if the solicitor is not entitled to apply his mind to the 
appropriateness of the bargain as against the legal 
validity of the contract, there is very little in respect 
of which a solicitor can exercise his discretion. Normally 
a client in seeking a solicitor ' s opinion as to a contract, 
would expect advice as to the transaction as well as the 
mere legal formalities, whatever they may be". 
His Honour concluded by stating, as Woodhouse J . quotes at page 209 of 
the Provost Developments case, that 
" I am satisfied in this case, from an examination of the 
document and the surrounding circumstances, that both parties 
intended that they should have the benefit of their solicitors ' 
advice concerning the bargain and that in the event of either 
solicitor disapproving the bargain , there would be no binding 
contract " . 
His Honour ' s view was , that as the agreement did contain terms unfavourable 
to the vendors , and as the vendor ' s solicitor did not disapprove solely 
because of the instructions he received from his client , the withholding 
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of approval was not capriciou s o r in bad faith , but a va l id exercise of the 
solicitor ' s discretion . The vendor ' s were therefore not bound to perform 
the contract . However if the vendor ' s solicitor had withheld his approval 
solely because a better offer was available , the refusal to approve would 
have been invalid in Holland J . ' s view . His Honour would also have declared 
it invalid if the vendor ' s solicitor had disapproved solely because of the 
instructions he received from his client. 
c. 
1. 
The Decision on Appeal 
The Issues 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal on two principal 
The issues were : 
(1) Whether the execution of a sale and purchase agreement of a 
final and comprehensive nature , between two commercially 
aware parties , amounts to an immediately binding contract 
where a term of the agreement is a "solicitor ' s approval" 
clause? 
(2) What aspects of a transaction between two commercially 
aware parties could a solicitor exercising his discretion 
under a "solicitor ' s approval" clause in a contract validly 
take into account? 
issues . 
Both issues are in essence issues as to the intention of the parties. 
They are concerned with the interpretation of a clause in a written 
instrument. In Halsbury Laws of England (4th ed . 1973) at paragraph 1459 , 
under the heading "Object of Interpretation ", it is stated that " the object 
of all interpretation of a written instrument is to discover the real 
intention of the author , the written declaration of whose mind it is always 
considered to be . Consequently, the construction must be as near to the 
minds and apparent intention of the parties as is possible, and as the law 
will permit ". 
The Court of Appeal , in considering the issues , accepted Holland J. ' s 
findings of fact at first instance. 
2. The Existence of a Contract 
The literal interpretation of the words " subject to solicitors ' 
approval " would have led one to believe there was no contract until the 
solicitors approved. A logical restatement of the clause would be , 
"contract binding subsequent to solicitors' approval ". However, the Court 
of Appeal preferred to refrain from a literal interpretation. Their Honours 
recognised that the exact wording of such clauses in standard form agreements , 
are not a real representation of the parties intentions , because they do not 
choose them . In such situations, accepted practice and the surrounding 
circumstances of the particular case , have much greater significance as a 
basis for examining the intention of the parties. 
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Cooke J., at page 209 of the Provost Developments case, states that it 
is accepted "that a provision requiring some approval by solicitors, does 
not necessarily mean that there is no contract at all". Whether there 
existed a contract in this particular case was a question which turned upon 
the meaning and effect of the words "subject to solicitors' approval". 
Richardson J. at page 212 of the Provost Developments case stated that, 
"the meaning and effect of such a provision is a question of 
construction. It is a matter of arriving at the true intention 
of the parties as expressed in the instrument, considered 
against the surrounding circumstances as they existed at the 
time of its execution. So I do not find it particularly helpful 
to attempt to categorise the kinds of provisions found in other 
cases, and I turn to consider the agreement between the parties 
to this appeal". 
This approach to the interpretation of agreements is consistent with 
that taken by Lord Morris in L. Schuler A.G. v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales 
Ltd. [1974] A.C. 235. His Honour states at page 256, that 
"If it is correct to say, as I think it is, that where there are 
problems of construction of an agreement the intention of the 
parties to it may be collected from the terms of their agreement 
and from the subject matter to which it relates, then I doubt 
whether, save in so far as guidance on principle is found, it 
is of much value (although it may be of much interest) to 
consider how courts have interpreted various differing words 
in various differing contracts. Nor is it of value to express 
either agreement or disagreement with the conclusions reached in 
particular cases". 
The cases dealing with "solicitor's approval" clauses fall into three 
basic categories: 
(1) The "solicitor's approval" clause is a term of an agreement and 
approval is expressly limited to title, form or the lease; or is expressly 
or impliedly from the words of the instrument, stated to be a condition 
subsequent to the formation of contract. In these situations, the "solicitor's 
approval" clause has been held to condition the performance of an already 
binding contract: Marten v. Whale [1917] 2 K.B. 480 (C.A.); Caney v. Leith 
[1937] 2 All E.R. 532; Boote v. R.T. Shiels and Co. Ltd. [1978] l NZLR 445. 
(2) The "solicitor's approval" is expressly directed to the substance 
of the contract as well as it's form, or the approval is expressly or impliedly 
from the words of the agreement, stated to be precedent to the creation of 
legal relations, or is a condition on offer or acceptance. In these 
situations, the "solicitor's approval" clause has generally been held to be 
a condition precedent to the formation of a binding contract: Henning v. 
Ramsay [1964] NSWR 1165; Buhrer v. Tweedie [1973] l NZLR 517; Frampton v. 
Mccully [1976] l NZLR 270. 
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(3) The " solicitor ' s approval " clause is a term of an agreeme n t b u t 
approval is not expressly directed towards any aspect of the contract , 
specifically or generally . The " solicitor ' s approval " clause exists in a 
non-definitive literal context . The meaning and effect of the " solicitor ' s 
approval " clause will then depend on the surrounding circumstance , but 
ordinarily the fact that the clause is a term of a commercial agreement , 
specifically referring to " solicitors ", will indicate the fact of agreement 
and an intention to create legal relations. Ordinarily in this situation 
therefore , the " solicitor ' s approval " clause will condition the performance 
of the contract and not its formation : Provost Developments Ltd . v . 
Collingwood Towers Ltd . [1980] 2 NZLR 205. 
In considering the meaning and effect of the words of the "solicitor ' s 
approval " clause in the Provost Developments case, their Honours did not 
refer to the letter sent by the vendor ' s solicitor to the purchaser ' s 
solicitor , which stated "The contract is at an end ". For the purpose of 
interpreting the intention of the parties, events subsequent to the signing 
of the final agreement are irrelevant : L. Schuler A.G. v. Wickman Machine 
Tool Sales Ltd. [1974] A. C. 225. 
Woodhouse J . emphasised at page 208 of the Provost Developments case , 
that the approval clause "sp,~aks explicitly of the approval of solicitors , 
and it does so in the context of a comprehensive and detailed agreement 
for sale and purchase. The breadth of the discretion is qualified by the 
contemplated use of professional expertise of the solicitors as such rather 
than the much wider approach that might be adopted on an open basis by some 
more general adviser ". His Honour concluded that this must mean an 
immediately binding contract was intended because if there was no such 
contract there would be no obligations owed by either party and the 
discretion would be completely unfettered. 
CookeJ. in the Provost Developments case referred to the considerable 
bargaining of the parties prior to the execution of the agreement , the fact 
that the parties entered into a formal agreement for sale and purchase , and 
also the fact that it was not contemplated that any further contractual 
document was to be drawn up. His Honour reasoned that these circumstances 
pointed to there being a natural and reasonable expectation of a binding 
legal relationship arising between the parties on execution . 
Richardson J . in the Provost Developments case pointed out that it was a 
commercial transaction between two commercially aware parties where the 
contract was in the form of an agreement which left no details of the 
transaction to be determined. It was also a requirement that a deposit be 
paid on the signing of the agreement. These circumstances , in His Honour ' s 
view , indicated that the parties intention was to enter into an immediately 
binding contract . 
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To understand the conclusion of their Honours on this issue, it is 
necessary to review the requirements of a valid contract. In Halsbury, 
Laws of England (4th ed. 1973 -) at paragraph 203, it is stated that, 
"To constitute a valid contract; (1) there must be two or more 
separate and definite parties to the contract; (2) those 
parties must be in agreement, that is there must be a consensus 
ad idem; (3) those parties must intend to create legal 
relations in the sense that the promises of each side are to 
be enforceable simply because they are contractual promises; 
(4) the promises of each party must be supported by consideration, 
or by some other factor which the law considers sufficient, 
generally speaking the law does not enforce a bare promise 
(nudum pactum) but only a bargain". 
The question of determining the existence of a contract in the case 
of a written instrument containing a condition, is essentially a question 
of whether the parties have or have not completed the process of reaching 
agreement. This is generally deduced from the surrounding circumstances 
of each particular case. In the Provost Developments case, the form of the 
written instrument (as an agreement), its execution as a result of 
considerable bargaining, and the completeness of its content, all indicated 
that the parties had reached agreement as to the terms of the contract. The 
specifity of the adviser in the approval condition, namely the solicitor, 
meant that according to the circumstances, the solicitor's discretion could 
be limited to exclude a review of matters essential to the existence of the 
particular contractual agreement or bargain. In the Provost Developments 
case the parties were commercially aware. They would therefore not have 
intended their solicitors to advise them on commercial matters but only on 
matters peculiarly within the solicitor's sphere. 
The question of the existence of a contract can also be a question of 
whether or not the parties intend to create legal relations. In the case 
of commercial agreements, it is a presumption that the parties intend to 
create legal relations, and the question which arises is whether a 
"solicitor's approval" clause defeats that presumption. In Halsbury, Laws 
of England (4th ed. 1973 -) , it is stated at paragraph 303 that "to oust 
expressly the presumption of intention to create legal relations, clear 
words must be used". It is the express ousting which is relevant in this 
situation. However in the Provost Developments case the agreement was 
commercial in nature and there was no express ousting of an intention to 
c reate legal relations. 
The conclusion of their Honours in the Provost Developments case, on 
the existence of a contract, is clearly correct on an analysis of the 
applicable law and its application to the facts of the case. However, 
problems may arise in other cases because, as a current legal practitioner 
has stated in Jenkinson "Subject to Solicitor's Approval" (1980) NZLJ 430 
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a t p age 431, 
"the condi t ion is u sually inserted because t he par ty is 
i nexpe r ienced in b usiness matters , unsure of himsel f , 
has been told by his solicitor never to sign anything 
without his approval , doesn ' t trust the l and agent , or 
j u s t wants to have the benefit of having some more time 
to think about it and/or his solicitor ' s advice " . 
J enkinson believes that most lay people understand a "solicitors ' approval " 
c l a u se to mean exactly what the term implies , that there is no contract at 
a ll unless and until the solicitor ' s approval is given . The layman sees 
his solicitor as a man of affairs who can offer general advice and who he 
can rely on to act on his instructions , for this is the solicitor ' s 
o r dinary role . 
The question to now be considered is whether in these circumstances 
a "solicitor ' s approval " clause in a sale and purchase agreement , can 
operate to prevent the formation of a contract . In considering this 
question , it is necessary to take into account Cooke J. ' s statement in the 
Provost Developments case at page 210 , that " a decision now by this Court 
indicating that a clause as to approval by solicitors is likely to rule out 
any contract would be against the New Zealand trend ". Cooke J. is 
concerned that " solicitors ' approval " clauses should not be used as 
substitutes for options to purchase . In an option to purchase , the 
p u rchaser pays the vendor a sum of money in return for having a fixed period 
of time in which he can consider all aspects of the transaction and 
depending on his findings decide to purchase the property or to leave it. 
During this time the vendor can only keep the property open for sale to the 
purchaser alone , and he can only offer it to someone else if the purchaser 
declines to proceed with the purchase. If this were to occur under an 
ineffective agreement , the vendor would receive no recompense for holding 
the property for the purchaser . 
Where there is a strong seller ' s market there arises problems for the 
purchaser under an ineffective agreement . The vendor is likely to get many 
offers and so there arises the possibility of gazumping . Gazumping is the 
situation that occurs when a vendor accepts an offer from a purchaser to 
buy a property , but the agreement they execute is ineffective as a contract 
until a condition precedent in the agreement is fulfilled . Before this 
fulfiment the vendor is not bound to honour the agreement and can accept a 
better offer. If this happens , the purchaser ' s implied expectation of 
buying the property is let down . He has been gazumped . This is clearly 
undesirable from the purchaser ' s point of view , and as Cooke J . states at 
page 210 of the Provost Developments case , " the Courts in this country have 
.. . been mindful of the need ... to deter or prevent buyers and sellers of 
houses from letting each other down without a valid reason ". 
9. 
Cooke J. concedes at page 210 of the Provost Developments case that 
" I am not sure that on balance the interests of purchasers as ' consumers' 
would be better served by treating an agreement of the present type as 
totally ineffective". His Honour seems to consider , however , that the 
prevention of defeating the expectation of buying or selling a property 
is more important than the interests of purchasers as consumers. His 
Honour is clearly influenced by the fact that if the purchaser intends an 
option to purchase , that can be agreed upon and paid for as such . The fact , 
therefore, that in a situation of a duly executed , final and comprehensive , 
sale and purchase agreement containing a "solicitors ' approval " clause, it 
can be implied from the surrounding circumstances that the purchaser 
intended his solicitor to act as a general adviser, is unlikely to persuade 
the courts to hold that there is no conract. For balancing this is the 
more important consideration in the Court's view, that the vendor's implied 
expectation of selling the property could be let down without a good reason. 
The situation may be different however, if there is an express reference 
to the solicitor as a general adviser. The purchaser's expectation of 
buying the property is only implied and this may be defeated by such an 
express reference. Such a situation would probably be a category (2) case. 
As Woodhouse J. comments on page 208 of the Provost Developments case, the 
obligations arising under a contract would be entirely illusory where the 
solicitor's discretion is unfettered, and so a reference to the solicitor 
as a general adviser would indicate a lack of agreement and so no contract. 
The situation might also be different if in the context of an unexecuted 
draft agreement or a tentative agreement, the circumstances imply that 
a solicitor under a "solicitors' approval" clause in the agreement, was 
intended to act as a general adviser. Richardson J. states at page 213 of 
the Provost Developments case, that in this situation, "it might have been 
argued that a solicitor could be expected to reach a conclusion as to 
whether it was appropriate for his client to proceed with the transaction 
as provided in the agreement. In so doing he would consider each of the 
terms of the bargain as it affected his client". This would also indicate 
a lack of agreement and so no contract. 
3 . The Range of Considerations 
The approach of the Court to the second issue in the Provost Developments 
case is consistent with that applied to the first issue. The conclusion 
of their Honours was based on an analysis of the intention of the parties as 
revealed by the wording of the relevant provision considered against the 
surrounding circumstances. Their Honours noted the specific reference to 
"solicitors" as opposed to a more general adviser and considered this against 
the commercial awareness of the parties and the existence of a contract. 
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These factors combined to support the Court of Appeal ' s conclusion in t he 
Provost Development ' s case that the vendor ' s solicitor ' s discr e t ion was 
intended to be limited to a consideration of the " legal i mplications " of 
the t ransaction as against the appropriateness of the bargain . 
Woodhouse J . at page 209 of the Provost Developments case states that, 
" If the solicitor were able or obliged to estimate the value 
for his client of the bargain itself , there would seem to be 
no issues at all , whether objective or subjective , that could 
not properly be taken into account .... In s u ch a situ ation 
the condition would have the same wide- open effect of a 
' s ubject to contract ' clause and would prevent the actual 
formation of the conditional contract". 
The formation of the condition contract would be prevented by such a 
discre t ion because as Woodhouse J . states at page 208 of the Provost 
Deve l opments case , " the notion of obligations arising in terms of a contract 
already concluded wou l d be entirely illusory " . In limiting the range of 
considerations of the solicitor to exclude matters going to the value of 
the bargain itself , Woodhouse J. described the responsibilities of the 
vendor ' s solicitor under the "solicitors ' approval " clause as being to 
assess the " legal implications " of the transaction only. 
In applying this test in the Provost Developments case , His Honour 
rejected the val idity of the existence of a better offer and the delay in 
cash payment as proper reasons for disapproval because they went to the 
value of the bargain . The third reason , the concern about possible 
difficulties in complying with the vacantpossession requirement, His 
Honour regarded as being proper for consideration if a legal impediment was 
involved . However as this reason was a secondary consideration in that the 
vendor ' s solicitor would have approved had there not b een a better offer , 
it was the validity of disapproving because of a better offer which decided 
the validity of the solicitor's disapproval. It is therefore implicit , 
that where a proper consideration or considerations are taken into account 
with an improper consideration, the proper consideration or considerations 
will only operate to validate a solicitor's disapproval under a " solicitors ' 
approval " clause in a contract if the solicitor would still have disapproved 
without having taken into account the improper consideration . 
Cooke J . at page 211 of the Provost Developments case phrased the test 
for limiting the considerations of the solicitor as " considerations 
peculiarly within the solicitor ' s sphere ". In applying this test , Cooke J. 
is generally in agreement with Woodhouse J ., but His Honour also makes the 
important point that the same consideration may in different circumstances 
be both a matter going to the appropriateness of the bargain and a legal 
implication . 
ll. 
His Honour states at page 211 of the Provost Developments case that 
"One can imagine a case of a solicitor pointing out to an 
unsophisticated vendor that a contract required vacant 
possession to be given and that this could not be complied 
with. I would not exclude the possibility of the clause 
being used justifiably in such a case. But in this case 
in the clause referring to existing tenancies (cl. 16), 
the words 'subject to' had plainly been struck out and 
'free of' plainly left standing. The business of the 
vendor company consisted of letting the properties in the 
Ponsonby-Freeman's Bay area which are the subject of the 
contract. It would be stretching the imagination to suggest 
that at the time of signing the contract the vendor was not 
fully alive to the obligation to give possession free of 
tenancies by 28 July 1978 and to whether or not any difficulties 
were likely to arise in that respect". 
This statement indicates that a legal impediment to giving vacant 
possession would not have been a valid reason for disapproval on the facts 
of the Provost Developments case because it would have been a matter taken 
into account by the vendor in arriving at a bargain with the purchaser. 
It may be possible to argue therefore that a relevant matter not taken into 
account by a party to a contract in arriving at a bargain is outside the 
bounds of the appropriateness of that particular bargain. If this is the 
case then it may be able to be included within the "legal implications " 
of the transaction. The meaning of the term "legal implications" is dealt 
with to some extent by Richardson J. 
"Legal implications" is defined in a wider sense than "conveyancing 
implications" by Richardson J. His Honour includes the latter in the 
former. "Conveyancing implications" relate to the form of the agreement. 
Richardson J. states at page 214 of the Provost Developments case that the 
"legal implications" of a transaction include "the form of the agreement, 
its validity, and the burden of the commitments entered into thereunder by 
their respective clients ". In this respect the "conveyancing aspects" 
test in the Boote case is expanded by the Provost Developments case. A 
"legal implication" can be defined as a matter having a consequence in law, 
a definition which has wide possibilities. 
The need to expand the considerations of a solicitor under a 
"solicitors' approval" clause beyond the form of the agreement arises 
especially in the case of standard form agreements because otherwise there 
would be little purpose in such a clause . Holland J. at first instance 
went too far in expanding the solicitor's discretion however. Richardson 
J. at page 214 of the Provost Developments case states that Holland J. "was 
over-influenced by his view of the role of a New Zealand solicitor today and 
did not give sufficient recognition to his earlier conclusion, with which 
I agree, that the parties had entered into a concluded contract and had 
reached agreement between themselves on all matters". 
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The " form of the agreement " is a consideration which ent itles the 
solici t or to examine the written instrument r epresenting the agr eement 
to ensure that the bargain reached by his client is proper l y represented in 
that instrument and is not altered in any way by an improper use of the 
language of that instrument . The burden of the commitments entered into 
under s u ch an agreement by a solicitor ' s client is a consideration which 
entitl es a solicitor to disapprove the agreement if there is some legal , 
financial , or other difficulty which prevents his client from be i ng ab l e 
to perform the contract . The performance of a contract is recognised as 
a consequence in law . The validity of an agreement is affected by many 
factors. Misrepresentation , duress , undu e influence , mistake and possibly 
unequal bargaining power , all affect the validity of an agreement . 
Misrepresentation is governed by the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 . 
A misrepresentation is a representation that is untrue . A representation 
is a statement of fact made by one party to the contract (the representor) 
to the other (the representee) which , while not forming a term of the 
contract , is yet one of the reasons that induces the representee to enter 
into the contract. Under section 6(1) of the Contractual Remedies Act 
1979 , a party induced into a contract by a fraudulent or innocent 
misrepresentation of another party is entitled to damages. Under section 
7 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 , a misrepresentation having a 
substantial effect on the contract entitles the suffering party to cancel 
the contract after which he may apply to the Court for relief .
1 
The legal consequences of damages or cancellation with possible relief 
therefore operate to entitle a solicitor to disapprove a contract if his 
client has suffered as a party to that contract because of an innocent or 
fraudulent misrepresentation of another party . However, it might be of 
more financial benefit for the client if the solicitor approved and 
secured the remedies available. This might not be good practice however 
if there is a provision in the contract , 
"purporting to preclude a Court from inquiring into or determining 
the question; 
(a) Whether a statement , promise, or undertaking was made or 
given , either in words or by conduct , in connection with 
or in the course of negotiations leading to the making of 
the contract; or 
(b) Whether , if it was so made or given , it constituted a 
representation or term of the contract; or 
2 (c) Whether, if it was a representation, it was relied on". 
In this situation, a Court will be precluded by that provision from 
inquiring into and determining any such question if 
" the Court considers that it is fair and reasonable that the 
provision should be conclusive between the parties, having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case , including the 
13. 
subject-matter and value of the transaction, the respective 
bargaining strengths of the parties, and the question whether any party was represented or advised by a solicitor at the time of the negotiations or at any other relevant time". 3 
A solicitor acting under a "solicitors' approval" clause prior to 
performance of a contract is acting at a "relevant time" because the 
contract will not need to be performed if he properly refuses to approve 
it. If he does approve the contract then the Courts may be strongly 
persuaded that the exception provision should be conclusive between the 
parties. The client will then be precluded from securing any of the 
remedies for misrepresentation under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. 
Duress is the legal term used to describe the procuring of a contract 
by actual violence or threats of violence to the person. The effect of 
duress is to make the contract either void or voidable. Undue influence 
is where one party to a contract benefits from the contract by exerting 
an influence over the other party which prevents that other party from 
exercising an independent judgement in the matter in question. Its 
effect is to make the contract voidable. Duress and undue influence 
clearly come within the meaning of "legal implications". 
Unequal bargaining power is not yet by itself an established doctrine 
of law. However there are signs that it may develop as such. This is 
an important area for "solicitors' approval" clauses because it promises 
to transform a situation of a party accepting unfair terms in a contract 
in an unequal bargaining power context, from a consideration going to the 
appropriateness of the bargain to a "legal implication" appropriate for a 
solicitor's consideration under a "solicitors' approval" clause in a 
contract. The doctrine of unequal bargaining power is espoused in an 
obiter dictum statement of Lord Denning in Lloyd's Bank v. Bundy [1975) 
Q.B. 326 at page 339, which was neither approved nor disapproved by the 
other members of the Court. The distinction between the doctrines of 
undue influence and unequal bargaining power is that in the latter, a 
contract will be voidable even if the "undue influence" being felt by the 
suffering party is not being exerted by the other party but is merely a 
consequence of a situation of unequal bargaining power. The result of the 
unequal bargaining power doctrine is to make the contract voidable. 
Lord Denning states in the Lloyd's Bank case that in the unequal 
bargaining power situation, independent advice may save the transaction. 
If in an unequal bargaining power situation the agreement concerned 
contains a "solicitors' approval" clause, the Courts should therefore be 
sensitive to the solicitor's role as an independent adviser. In this 
situation his role should be a general one. The Courts might hold that 
in the circumstances, the client intended the solicitor to act under the 
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approval clause as a general adviser, in which case a further consequence 
might be that there was no immediate contract at all. They might, on the 
other hand, hold that an unfair contract resulting from a situation of 
unequal bargaining power is legally voidable and so a "legal implication" 
for which the solicitor can disapprove the contract. 
A mistake by the client has "legal implications" if it qualifies as 
a mistake for which relief may be granted under section 7 of the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977. "Mistake " is defined as meaning " a mistake, 
4 
whether of law or fact". To qualify as a mistake for which relief may 
be granted, the mistake must be by one party to the contract and to be 
known to the opposing party or be common or mutual to the parties to the 
contract .
5 
The mistake must also have a substantial effect on the contract
6 
and the affected party must not be covered by a clause in the contract 
stating that he assumes the risk that his belief about the matter in 
question might be mistaken.
7 
However, as is the case with a misrepresent-
ation, it might be of more benefit for the solicitor to approve and to 
secure relief under section 7 of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977. 
The limitation of a solicitor under a " solicitors ' approval " clause 
to a consideration of the "legal implications" of the transaction is not 
the only limitation on his discretion. A solicitor would not be able to 
disapprove a transaction because of a " legal implication" of that 
transaction which was not unfavourable to his client. As Cooke J. states 
at page 211 of the Provost Developments case , " the solicitors were required 
to consider the contract bona fide and reasonably". In Caney v . Leith 
[1937)2 All E.R. 532 , Farwell J. states at page 538 that included within 
the bounds of an unreasonable act by a solicitor acting under a " solicitor ' s 
approval" clause , are those situations where solicitors, 
"to assist their client and get him out of the contract , or 
for some other reason, refuse to approve the lease, without 
giving the matter any consideration at all, or where the 
reasons for disapproval are so patent and absurd that the 
Court can say in a moment: 'This is ridiculous and the 
solicitors cannot possibly make such an objection as that'. " 
Despite the limitations however, it can be concluded that the "legal 
implications " test is flexible enough to cover the differing demands of 
parties of various strengths , to contracts which are "subject to 
solicitors ' approval ". It is clear that the Courts will seek to allow a 
solicitor under a " solicitors ' approval " clause to disapprove where there 
is something substantially wrong with a contract. The Court ' s basic 
concern is to limit the relevant considerations under a "solicitors ' 
approval " clause so that the reasonable expectations of parties are not 
let down without a valid reason. 
15 . 
III . CONCLUSION 
The decision in the Provost Developments case can fairly be seen 
as an attempt by the Court of Appeal to place proper limits on agreements 
with no obligations, as a prevention against gazumping. If parties intend 
to create merely an option to purchase, then they should enter into one and 
pay for it accordingly. The Provost decision clearly emphasises the need 
for consultation between a solicitor and his client before the client goes 
ahead with signing any documents placed in front of him by a real estate 
agent . Otherwise , the client runs the risk of ascribing to an intention 
represented by a document which is not in fact his/her actual intention . 
Footnotes 
l 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979, S.9. 
2 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979, S .4 (1). 
3 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979, S .4 (1). 
4 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, S.2. 
5 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, S.6(l)(a). 
6 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, S.6(l)(b). 
7 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, S.6(l)(c). 
·11111\i ilil (1ii1lii1li fi'I 11'111itt (1li 11'.li llliiiiliill 
3 7212 00442948 4 
, ~ 
~ 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON -0 • LIBRARY ~ 
T • • 
" ~ . I ) LAV-I 
IS~ t' Ac:l\tcf 8 f"l 
i 
r 
J \ 
~ 
t 
, ~ A fiAe of 1 Oc per day is 
charged on overdue books 0 

